Skyrms proposed to look at the matter not as a decision-making problem, but as the outcome of a Darwinian process. He offered the following model. 7 Suppose a large population of agents plays Divide the Cake repeatedly. With a cake that can be sliced into n equal portions, the composition of the population is given by the vector where x i is the proportion of players demanding i slices of cake. Over time, the frequency of types in the population changes in accordance with the so-called replicator dynamic: 8 Here i f is the payoff of those demanding i slices -we can call them the "i-strategists" -and f is the average payoff in the population. 9 The replicator dynamic is one of the most commonly used equations of change in evolutionary modeling. Its key feature is that the proportion of a strategy in the population is a direct function of how it does relative to the average payoff in the population. As i f increases relative to f , so does the growth of i x : the more successful a strategy is the faster it spreads. The replicator equation originates in evolutionary biology, but under certain assumptions it can be interpreted as representing a cultural dynamic driven by payoffbased imitation. If players imitate successful strategies more often than unsuccessful ones, the result is a Darwinian dynamic in which the successful strategies spread though imitation learning.
7 H. Payton Young had previously offered a bargaining model for the evolution of the equal split, focusing on the same game. See: "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining", Journal of Economic Theory, LIX (1993): 149-168. Young's model is similar in spirit to Skyrms', but some of its technical aspects are more complex and it is not as overtly designed to account for the evolution of justice. 8 There are two differences between the initial model and a later model by Skyrms and Jason Alexander, which I discuss below. First, the later one allows slicing the cake in ten whereas the initial model employed a more restricted strategy space. Second, the initial model used a continuous-time version of the replicator equation. Here I present the discrete-time version used in the later work. Both points do not affect my arguments. For a comprehensive discussion of the replicator equation see Jörgen W. Weibull, Evolutionary Game Theory (Cambridge: MIT, 1995) . 9 The vector figures into the equation because the payoff gained by a strategist will depend on who it faces.
To do so they turned to agent-based modeling. An agent-based model represents players explicitly -as individuals with a strategy, a learning rule, a record of success in the game, often also as situated within a social network. In 1999 Skyrms and Jason Alexander proposed a model of this kind for Divide the Cake, as an extension of the initial model. 12 They considered a population of 10,000 agents playing Divide the Cake on a large lattice. In every iteration of the game each player is paired to her 8 immediate neighbors in turn. Each game involves, as before, the players making demands according to their strategies and garnering payoff. At the end of each round each player compares herself to her neighbors and adopts the strategy of the neighbor with the highest overall payoff for that round. 13 This way of updating one's strategy is known as "imitate your best neighbor".
The results were consonant with the main message of the initial model. Skyrms and Alexander found that for upwards of 99% of population configurations they simulated, the outcome was an equal split. 14 All that was required was the presence of a small cluster of interacting demand 5-ers -these then went on to "infect" the rest of the lattice. Recall that in the initial replicator model the key requirement for the evolution of the equal split was correlated pairing (positively correlated pairing, that is). In the agent-based model this is, in an important sense, still true. Positive correlation arises from the network structure, as "new" equal-splitters are inserted nearby the neighbors they take after. Recall also that the initial model involved a payoff-driven dynamic generated by imitation learning. This too is true in the later model, where imitation is given a concrete "imitate your best neighbor" form.
12 Jason Alexander & Brian Skyrms, "Bargaining with Neighbors: Is Justice Contagious?", Journal of Philosophy, XCVI (1999): 588-598. 13 So long as the neighbor is more successful than her. Ties are broken by a coin toss. 14 Due to the large number of parameters in such models, they are typically simulated on a computer, rather than solved analytically.
In recent work, Jason Alexander (now McKenzie Alexander) has delved deeper into agentbased models of Divide the Cake. 15 In a book-length treatment of the origin of morality, he explores a range of network models, including "small-world" networks, where phenomena like six-degrees-of-separation are common and bounded-degree networks, which have a constrained random structure. McKenzie Alexander also enlarges the class of imitation rules to include, e.g., "imitate with proportion relative to success"; or a rule that has players play the game with their neighbors but imitate the agent with the best score in the entire population ("imitate the winner").
In these models too there is a remarkable tendency for populations to stabilize at an equal split.
As in earlier models, the combination of structure-generated correlation and payoff-based learning ensures that the strategy demand-5 is superior to more (or less) demanding alternatives.
A few words about the developmental trajectory of this work has will serve to summarize the discussion so far and set the stage for the argument to follow. The move from the initial replicator-based model to current agent-based models involved primarily a process of concretization: filling in specifics where the initial model contained abstract posits. The early model presupposed a payoff-driven populational dynamic, supervening on individual level imitation learning. But it provided little by way of detail on how social learning works. Later models made explicit various forms it could take. The initial model posited a like-meets-like bias in the pairing of players, but did not fill in this assumption -it took the form of a correlation parameter. In later models correlation was generated endogenously due to the fact that interactions occurred within a network and updating was neighborhood-based. Thus, the newer models offered an elaboration of the earlier model, proposing mechanisms for how its features arise. Significant details were added, but the basic picture was retained: a population of successseekers in which individuals have a better-than-random chance of meeting their ilk will tend to stabilize at a norm of equal sharing.
How much have we learned from these models about the origins of justice? Below, my goal is to answer this question. Let me emphasize that I am construing it as a substantive, largely scientific issue: I want to ask whether the models explain (or begin to explain) the origins of justice in the familiar, primarily causal sense in which scientific theories explain phenomena. My discussion does not rely on an expectation that the models in question yield testable or finegrained predictions. To expect that would be unreasonable, as we are dealing with a proposal for an explanatory framework, the subject matter of which is a set of highly complex phenomena.
But I will take it that the goal is to understand the origins of actual justice in the actual world.
My aim to assess whether the picture offered by game theoretic models is on the right track.
SYMMETRY
Let us first focus on some key symmetry assumptions. The game of Divide the Cake depicts two agents that have identical preferences, no special needs and no claims on the good they are dividing. Moreover, the good itself is nondescript: it is a windfall with no history nor an intended use, none of the agents involved had any role in producing or procuring it, it does not belong to anyone nor are there effects to distributing it beyond the immediate payoffs involved. The game describes in a simple form a pervasive kind of interpersonal interaction -bargaining for a resource in scarce supply -but the interaction occurs against an asocial background.
These symmetry assumptions greatly affect the kinds of norms that can be represented. For instance, many actual norms of distribution, including a variety of egalitarian norms, take into account the relative contributions of agents -direct or indirect -to the production of the goods being distributed. Many norms also take into account the effects of distributing a good, how needy the distributees are, as well as the ends to which they will use their share. 16 Such attributes of players are not represented in the game of Divide the Cake and, at least with respect to some of them (e.g. neediness), it is unclear that a model of this sort can represent the relevant facts.
Moreover, it is highly doubtful that an evolutionary model that incorporated these aspects would yield an egalitarian result similar to equal splitting.
Thus, while the equal split might be representative of egalitarian rules of justice, its degree of generality is fairly limited. Even if we were to take the Divide the Cake models to provide a full explanation of the tendency of laboratory subjects to demand ½, and the concomitant intuitive pull of the equal split solution, it is far from clear that we can extrapolate from this to other cases where distributive problems arise, even cases in which an egalitarian solution is salient.
TYPES OF LEARNING
Now let us set aside worries about generality and look at a more fundamental explanatory question. The evolutionary game theoretic models that are our focus portray moral change as a cultural evolutionary process. This type of populational change is not biological, but it bears behaviors. In success-based learning, as I will call it (or simply 'success learning')The adoption of new behaviors is biased towards those that increase payoff. That is, individuals adopt new behaviors in a payoff-driven fashion, seeking strategies that will increase their gains in future rounds of the game. The idea that learning is success-based is pivotal to the game theoretic framework and to the explanation of justice here at issue, so it is worth going into more detail.
17 Many (arguably most) writers in this area would nowadays reject the idea that the contours of moral norms in present day societies can be explained purely, of even primarily, as the result biological evolution.
The initial model employed the replicator equation. As noted above, this equation of change has strategies spread as a function of how well they are doing relative to the population average.
Strategies that do better than average proliferate. The replicator equation can receive a cultural interpretation. The idea is that if individual agents tend to mimic those who perform better, strategies that do better will get mimicked at a higher rate across the population. The replicator equation thus represents the aggregate effects of individual-level success learning. In the later agent-based models success learning is given a more explicit form. Individuals are represented severally and so for every individual the model must specify an update rule. This allows the injection of some real-life complexity into update rules. Skyrms and Alexander used a characteristic success-based rule -"imitate your best neighbor". Other success-based imitation rules include "imitate proportional to success" and "imitate the winner". But success learning is not especially tied to imitation. Consider "best response": this rule has the player monitor the behavior of all her neighbors and then calculate which strategy will give the highest overall payoff in the next move, assuming neighbors will continue to behave as they did. "Best response" is a high-rationality mechanism compared with imitating the more successful. Less sophisticated rules also exist. In reinforcement learning, for instance, a player chooses her strategy based on the cumulative payoff it has yielded in the past.
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What I have called success learning is therefore a bias in the direction of adopting behaviors associated with specific expectations about success -those that are likely to yield higher payoffs in the future, or have done so for others (the latter, of course, is often a good proxy for the former). The appeal to success-based rules represents a picture in which agents are driven to change their behavior by directly attending to the relation between their success and that of their peers.
To better understand what is distinct about success learning, it will help to consider other types of social learning. Here are two important ones.
Source learning involves a bias in favor of particular role players in the learner's environment -parents, teachers, superiors, celebrities. In source-based learning an individual's adoption of behaviors is guided by the fact that other individuals, those who occupy a particular role, exhibit this behavior. In recent work, Kevin Laland has referred to this as "who" learning.
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There may be a (biological) evolutionary explanation for why children and young adults tend to emulate the morality of parents or other salient individuals in their surroundings. 20 The resultant sharing of knowledge or the strengthening of in-group cohesion may have enhanced ancestral
fitness. But models of cultural evolution start, as it were, where biological evolution ends.
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Their concern is with figuring out how the process of cultural change looks given a preexisting cognitive toolkit, including patterns of learning and social adaptation. As with source learning, the idea of frequency-bias can be readily modeled. It is also quite apparent that processes in which herd effects play an important role will tend to behave differently than success-based processes. The initial configuration of a population will matter more, and one would expect to find snowball effects owing to the self-reinforcing nature of conformism and herd phenomena. Frequency bias also leads to populations that are less susceptible to small perturbations, erratic flips in an individual's behavior, trial and error and the like. When being common is what determines a strategy's fate the appearance of a small number of outliers is less likely to make a significant impact.
JUSTIFYING SUCCESS LEARNING?
22 The empirical literature on moral education and development is not couched in terms of the categories I have discussed. But there is ample evidence that social learning in general, and moral learning in particular, involves source and frequency biases. Many psychologists studying moral development take parental guidance to be the key to the acquisition of moral norms.
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There are cognitive psychological experiments that demonstrate that people differentially pick up 23 How these factors interact, and how to model their interaction, are interesting questions in their own right. It is possible their effects are additive, in which case each factor can be assigned a weight in an overall sum. More complex possibilities include default/threshold rules, e.g. "follow the leader, unless you can gain more than x by doing otherwise" or "maximize payoff, unless you find yourself in too small a minority". 
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The second way one could justify the assumption of success learning is via robustness analysis. Roughly put, robustness analysis shows how well a result holds up in a variety of setups, thereby demonstrating which factors make a difference to it and which do not. the pressure and volume of a gas (of fixed volume and temperature) while varying the shape of the chamber is a way of examining whether the geometry of the chamber is a difference making factor (for the dependence of volume on pressure). If varying the geometry has no effect on the relationship between pressure and volume then this is evidence that it is not a relevant difference maker. 30 Analogously, if we substituted for the success-based learning rules used in Divide the Cake models a variety of rules like the ones discussed in the previous section and if, doing so, we still observed a strong tendency to arrive at an equal split, this would tell us that equal splitting is A different kind of reply to the criticism I have made is that it is premature. Models of the evolution of morality, and the models we have looked at in particular, are at an early stage. Like most modeling, its beginnings are simple and limited. The models target a restricted set of phenomena, make simplifying assumptions and aim for a partial fit with the world. Specifically, 30 Of course, one needs to ascertain that geometry was varied in the right ways, and that other significant factors have been held fixed.
one might concede that the assumption of success learning represents an over-simplification, but argue that it is merely a natural starting point, not an end to the investigation. Criticisms of it are founded on an unreasonable expectation that the model take the full complexity of real-life social phenomena into account. Such "start simple" responses are encountered fairly often in discussions of models. Impatient outsiders seek completeness while modelers exhibit a more pragmatic, one-factor-at-a-time approach, seeking a good understanding of simple scenarios before moving to more complex ones.
The "start simple" response is important and as far as it goes, correct. But it cuts both ways: If models of the evolution of morality are at an early stage in which it is hard as yet to justify the idealizing assumptions being made, then optimism about the explanatory value of this work should be kept in check. Indeed, caution should be taken with respect to the basic message of work on the evolution of morality -namely, that moral conduct evolves, in a way closely Success learning appears as a natural starting point if and to the extent that one thinks that it is likely that morality evolves by something like natural selection. Now, it is sometimes thought that if there is to be a scientific account of cultural change and the stabilization of norms, then this account must in some important sense be akin to Darwinian natural selection. But it is important to see that is not so. What is characteristic of Darwinian dynamics is that the differential spread of types in a population tracks success. In biology success equals increased offspring; in cultural evolution it translates into the rate at which individuals adopt a behavior or and source learning are rife. If so, the idea that morality evolves is fundamentally incorrect. In this sense the most basic message of work on the evolution of morality will not have been borne out.
MODES OF PROGRESS
The discussion of simple beginnings directs our attention to the diachronic aspect of modelbuilding. In modeling one starts simple but, ordinarily, seeks to add complexity as time goes by.
It is to the diachronic aspect of modeling the evolution of morality, and of modeling more Theorizing about the evolution of morality is in this respect a typical case of modeling. Models, in general, are usually local in scope and tend to contain significant idealization -assumptions that are known to be false are introduced in order to simplify the analysis and isolate causal factors.
One important kind of model-based inquiry involves the indirect investigation of a real-world phenomenon ("the target") via the analysis of a hypothetical construct ("the model"). theorizing that is overly focused on the real world may hamper understanding rather than promote it. But indirectness can lead theorists astray precisely because it legitimizes a looser fit between theory and reality. One goal of the present paper has been to evaluate the explanatory merits of game theoretic models of the evolution of morality. Another is to connect this evaluation to considerations that apply more generally to the process of modeling and its pitfalls.
Let me distinguish two modes in which progress in indirect modeling can be made. Both have epistemic significance, but of a different sort. Both characteristically involve moving from simple beginnings to more complex analyses. One mode of progress may be labeled the "targetoriented" mode. Here the move towards complexity is sensitive to factors that affect the behavior of the real world target, elements that make a causal difference to it. In the simplest (and perhaps ideal) case a model starts by examining one or a small number of important factors, typically in a simplified way, and initial results are obtained. As time goes by an effort is made to incorporate further factors and to gauge the importance of the factors included in the initial proposal.
Additional elements are either brought in or discovered to be irrelevant. If this kind of effort goes well then the result is greater understanding of a real-world target: progressively better knowledge about the causal process underlying the explanandum. We can contrast targetoriented progress with an "internal" mode of progress, which is more conceptual in spirit. Here a particular picture or set of assumptions is laid out, and then explored in its own terms. Detail is added primarily in order to refine the understanding of elements that are present to begin with.
Internal progress is made to the extent that the initial construct and its behavior are well understood, and that refinements are seen to either bear out and illuminate the initial results or complicate them in interesting ways. Thus, in a target-oriented mode a modeling endeavor makes progress by incrementally adding causal information. This can be done via experimental testing and empirical observation or via robustness analysis, but the crucial point is that the work is regulated primarily by its empirical adequacy. In contrast, in an internal mode one explores the subtleties of a constructed set-up, but this is done largely independently of the actual causal relevance of the set-up being explored.
Skyrms' initial model depicted a cultural process akin to evolution by natural selection and showed that it could lead to an egalitarian rule of justice. The underlying causal picture was of individuals haggling over a good and adapting their behavior to achieve greater bargaining success. Skyrms found that correlated pairing of players was vital. Later work was primarily devoted to filling in the initial picture. Network structure, which generated the correlation among players endogenously, was introduced. So were specific success-based learning rules which gave concrete form to the statistical trend embodied in the replicator equation. This amounted to real progress, I think, but progress of the internal kind; it was an exploration of the same sort of setup that was posited at the start. It was not progress of the target-oriented, causally informative variety. Little or no attempt was made to provide empirical grounding for the idea that "straight"
bargaining is the right way to capture justice or for the key simplifying assumption that moral learning is success-based. Nor was there a theoretical attempt to examine how much of an effect these assumptions have on the basic message that morality evolves through a cultural process akin to natural selection. epistemic parity, with the result that research that has taken a largely conceptual route appears to have yielded progress in answering explanatory questions about the empirical world.
While my argument only licenses conclusions about the case of models of the evolution of morality, I think it is important to recognize that this kind of situation can, in principle, occur in other instances of indirect modeling. That is to say, there is a type of error that can arise when an indirect modelling project, with its associated phenomenology, is developed in one way, but interpreted another way. Notice that this diagnosis differs from a suggestion that is commonly made when models are thought to float free from reality, namely that mathematical elegance or computational tractability are over-valued relative to empirical adequacy. Such complaints have recently been made, in extra-academic settings, against macroeconomists and string theorists. 
